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This paper offers an example of global politics in action by attending to the modalities 
and outcomes of United Nations negotiations on global warming. More precisely, the 
paper ethnographically traces how the capacity of tropical forests to be carbon sinks is 
turned into a matter of global concern. The focus is on a negotiated policy called 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) and its 
anchoring in the Democratic Republic of the Congo whose territory contains the 
second largest area of rainforest after Brazil. The paper proposes to discuss the 
importance of the promissory in climate actions, the multivalence of what is at stake 
and the porosity and resilience of national demarcation. To do so, it identifies three 
moments and sites of geopolitical re-composition: the formulation of international 
consensus, the work of preparatory agents, and the quest for metrological 
inclusiveness. These moments and sites point to the theatricality and semi-secrecy of 
United Nations negotiations, the mobilizing activity of expatriate consultants hired 
with overseas aid funding, and the unstable evidential grounds on which emission 
reduction efforts are based. The paper suggests that through this series of processes, 
the carbon stored by tropical forests becomes a matter of global exigency. 
 
Keywords: geopolitics; global exigency; negotiations; climate change; tropical 
deforestation; carbon markets. 
 
Global warming due to human-induced greenhouse gas emissions is a central problem 
of our age. As we start bearing witness to rising sea levels, species loss and extreme 
weather patterns, these harmful consequences are only set to intensify (Pachauri et al., 
2014). Networks of meteorological stations, models running on supercomputers, and 
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) have all been crucial in 
establishing this new matter of concern; and in the social sciences, a large body of 
work has been dedicated to the production and contestation of climate facts (e.g., Van 
der Sluijs et al., 1998; Demeritt, 2006; Edwards, 2010; Wynne, 2010; Oreskes, 2011; 
O’Reilly et al., 2012). International action deployed in response to this evidence-base 
has, however, tended to elude empirical attention. From a distance, United Nations 
negotiations on global warming look cumbersome and useless when contrasted with 
the sense of urgency found in IPCC assessments. Yet, year after year, delegates gather 
in conference centres, fight over words, and celebrate consensus. In this paper I thus 
propose to get closer to what is at stake in these tergiversations precipitated by the 
evidential practices of climatologists. 
Meetings of the Conference of the Parties, the assembly of all nation-states 
having ratified the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC), are not entirely reducible to endless discussion about long-term targets. 
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Debate can also aim to devise interventions on specific problems. ‘REDD+’ - an 
acronym standing for ‘policy approaches and positive incentives on issues relating to 
Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation [REDD]; and the role 
of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon 
stocks in developing countries [+]’ - is such an intervention and the topic of the paper. 
Neither a legislative body, nor a series of diplomatic rendezvous, the Conference of 
the Parties is a negotiation platform whose authority is, however, quite precarious 
(Yamin & Depledge, 2004); it has effect only if an agreement reached by a few 
individuals standing for sovereign nations survives beyond a piece of paper, an 
uncertain process illustrated here by the tentative emergence of REDD+.i 
From the start, the UN process has assigned roles and obligations in the 
collective action to address global warming. When the foundational principle of 
‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ initially tasked so-called developed 
nations with preventing further accumulation of atmospheric CO2 (United Nations, 
1992), the involvement in emission reduction efforts of so-called developing nations 
has gradually become a preeminent and sensitive theme (Bodansky, 2010). REDD+, 
or the negotiation around tropical forests as carbon sinks, was the first attempt to 
move in this direction. Simply put, trees are made of carbon they absorb while 
growing. In this light, tropical forests become valuable stocks of carbon whose 
existence in the future should be maintained, even enhanced. Since discussion on 
REDD+ begun in 2005, negotiators have not contested that forests are critical to our 
climate.ii Their disputes have rather revolved around how to act accordingly. How are 
reductions in deforestation and CO2 emissions to be achieved and calculated? Who 
ought to participate in policy-making? What sort of incentives would be provided, by 
whom, to whom, according to what conditions? While none of these questions has 
received clear-cut answers, interventions in the name of REDD+ have been popping 
up across the world in the early 2010s, including in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC) - where this paper will take us. 
But before turning to the empirical narrative, I propose first to discuss further 
some characteristics of this global politics. Despite what social scientists seem to 
expect, especially those facing climate denial in the United States (Oreskes, 2011), 
agreeing with scientific evidence published by the IPCC does not put an end to debate 
regarding global warming. Addressing the problem also implies the disputed 
negotiation of new international relations. To describe this process, I will pursue the 
move made by Barry (2001, 2013a) when he explores the making of political 
assemblages, like European standards of air quality or transnational energy 
infrastructures, with a focus on the devices, skills, and materiality involved. In 
particular, Barry’s work considers the ways in which things (chemical molecules, 
construction materials, etc.) are turned into ‘objects of international dispute’, things 
whose ‘material existence can itself become a political matter’ (2013b, p. 421). The 
CO2 absorbed by trees is precisely such an object of international confrontation. In 
this kind of disagreement mediated by scientific facts and technical instruments, 
‘political experts’ and their specific know-how play an important part (Barry, 2013b,  
p. 423); and to understand the power of evidential practices, these must be considered 
in relation to the art of political speech, the staging of unity or contention, and the 
organization of deliberation. In the case of climate action, the IPCC does provide 
authoritative numbers (e.g., carbon emissions due to tropical deforestation), but the 
global evidence is only a starting point for a slow, messy, and distributed negotiation 
process that mobilizes measurements and calculations in instrumental manners. iii 
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It follows that the main protagonists in this paper are not scientists and their 
models, but civil servants, consultants, and activists skilled in and committed to 
advocacy, the decision-making style of the United Nations, and the set-up of overseas 
aid programmes.iv I suggest that exploring what these actors do can foreground three 
key aspects of REDD+ politics: the importance of the promissory, the multivalence of 
what is at stake, and the porosity and resilience of national demarcation. 
With a negotiated policy anticipating the linkage of financial incentives to 
evidence of emission reductions, standing trees could bring substantial revenues to 
poor nations, or so it seems. In her work on oil in Sao Tomé e Principe, Weszkalnys 
(2011) shows how the mere prospect of the natural resource stimulates what she calls 
‘an economy of expectations’ (p. 349). This economy is fed by overseas aid 
interventions trying to establish the legal and institutional conditions for the proper 
management of the potential forthcoming income. The status of forests as carbon 
sinks generates, we will see, comparable preparatory actions and promises of reward 
based on fragile evidential grounds. Promissory actions have thus been identified in 
extractive industries (Tsing, 2005; Weszkalnys, 2011, 2015) and macroeconomic 
policies (Guyer, 2007). Here they are witnessed in the case of an environmental 
concern (deforestation and emissions) turned into an economic opportunity, a process 
comparable to addressing biodiversity loss by ‘enterprising nature’ as examined in 
Dempsey (2016). The overseas aid consultants I observed working in Kinshasa do not 
denying the dark predictions of a warming climate laid out by the IPCC. But when 
they enrol sponsors and envision interventions, they conjure up bright, economized 
futures that would be brought about by Congolese forests becoming valuable carbon 
sinks - with an optimism even they acknowledge to be slightly unrealistic. While 
DRC is usually known as the top rank in poverty, corruption, and violence indexes, 
REDD+ seems to promise to change its ‘place-in-the-world’ (cf. Ferguson, 2006). 
This optimistic unrealism, its pledges and the expectations they create, aim to start off 
a mobilization; whether such a motivational technique can prime profound changes is 
then another question.v 
Politics here is of a rather traditional sort, with people speaking on behalf of 
nations, voicing unsubstantiated claims about things to come, and defending universal 
causes. The paper only counts few instances of what Marres (2007) would call 
‘object-oriented politics’, wherein things (e.g., the shape of a plantation) and daily 
routines (e.g., the consumption of charcoal) become the locus of political engagement 
for the climate. The tergiversations around REDD+ seem actually less preoccupied 
with achieving tangible transformations than promising to encompass a vast range of 
aims, actors and interests. Global exigency in relation to climate action implies a 
requirement for being worldwide and comprehensive. To this effect, the negotiation 
process organizes ‘spaces of multi-valent action’, to use Marres’ terms again (2011, p. 
520; see also Callon, 2009). Attending to REDD+ inside and outside conference 
centres shows that the carbon stored in tropical forests has been associated in different 
ways with diverse concerns (e.g., national sovereignty, development, forest dwellers’ 
rights). Multivalence, we will see, is the outcome of a certain art of ambiguity in the 
iterative search for consensus; it is a way to acknowledge the complexity of such 
problems as deforestation and global warming, but it also tends to put the need to 
limit CO2 emissions at risk of being superseded by other priorities. 
Drawing from an ethnographic engagement with UN-based decision-making 
and efforts to reduce forest-related CO2 emissions in DRC, this paper seeks to locate 
the global, trace connections and attend to friction. The approach is inspired by Tsing 
(2005) and her stories of Borneo’s forests drawn into environmental campaigns and 
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timber trade that highlight the contingent making of fragile links, ‘across distance and 
difference’, through which universals like prosperity or freedom travel, change, and 
anchor themselves in particular places. The ‘global connections’ Tsing describes 
cross, blur, assert geographical and institutional boundaries; they point, I suggest, to 
the porosity and resilience of national demarcation in processes of globalization. 
Similarly, with the case of REDD+, this paper will show that, if sovereign nations 
endure as the public-facing entities in negotiation, alternative arrangements are woven 
around the capacity of trees in the tropics to absorb carbon. Relations emerge that are 
inter-national, in that they develop between nations partly by means of an attracting 
force which is distinct from national sovereignty, a (timid) multivalent concern for 
earthly things.vi Talking of geopolitics is how I propose to capture the carving of 
interstices in which a disputed, future-oriented togetherness takes shape around 
tropical forests and their carbon. These geopolitical re-compositions occur at specific 
moments and in specific sites that I will now explore: namely, the formulation of 




The formulation of international consensus 
 
Meetings of the Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC are the best place to start 
analysing the emergence of REDD+ and talk about geopolitical re-composition. vii 
Negotiations also happen in the meantime, during intermediate gatherings and maybe 
via diplomatic bargains unrelated to CO2. But annual sessions are when international 
agreements are settled. Initiated in the mid-1990s, they have become routinized 
gatherings, attended by thousands of individuals travelling from across the world and 
commented on by the media. Year after year, these events assert a collective 
willingness to consider the problem of global warming despite divergences on how 
this must be done, as we will see here in the case of carbon emissions from tropical 
forests. 
United Nations politics entails a form of theatricality through which 
internationality is enacted. A meeting of the Conference of the Parties always begins 
with plenaries convened in a conference centre, be it in Kyoto, Marrakech, or Paris. A 
few individuals from each of the 194 delegations sit for hours behind their ‘flag’, a 
sign on which the nation they personify is inscribed and that they wave to be allowed 
to speak in one of the six UN official languages. The succession of messages, some 
evoking threats and damages associated with a changing climate, embodies the 
assembly of all Parties that agreed on the treaty designating global warming as ‘a 
common concern of humankind’ (United Nations, 1992, p. 1). The ritual opens the 
negotiation. The assembly is gathered again at the end of the session to take decisions 
on behalf of the Conference of the Parties. Texts are usually brought to the final 
plenary if general assent has been secured first, and the closing moment ought to be a 
formality. Yet, in 2010, Bolivian delegates and the country’s President used the 
occasion to loudly reject what would become the Cancun Agreements. Relayed in the 
media (at least in British newspapers, see Randerson et al., 2010; Vidal, 2010), the 
protest was a proper happening in spite of which the Mexican minister of foreign 
affairs who was chairing this annual negotiation session banged her gavel to declare 
consensus. viii  The diplomatic drama is interesting for us because it was partly 
triggered by REDD+. 
 5 
In the UNFCCC archive, the REDD+ paper trail starts in 2005 with a proposal 
by Papua New Guinea and Costa Rica on behalf of half a dozen of other nations, 
including DRC. ix  At the centre of the initiative were two research and policy 
organizations, one American, the other Brazilian, and an eloquent New-York-based 
lawyer representing Papua New Guinea who quickly became a public figure of the 
negotiation. x  The text suggested dedicating a negotiation track to tropical 
deforestation, as the phenomenon had been found responsible in the 1990s for 10 to 
25 per cent of global anthropogenic emissions, according to the IPCC (UNFCCC, 
2005, p. 3). Developing nations had never before publicly acknowledged that their 
own CO2 could be a problem. Deforestation, the proposal went on, was due to ‘the 
absence of revenues streams from standing forests’ (UNFCCC, 2005, p. 4), and a 
solution could be to enable governments to calculate reductions in deforestation rates 
and emission levels and sell them as offsets to developed nations committed by the 
Kyoto Protocol to limit their emissions. 
Delegating emission reduction efforts to tropical forests was not, however, a 
totally new idea. Negotiators have talked about it as early as 1992 (Grubb et al., 
1993). The 1995 IPCC assessment construed forestry activities in low income regions 
as simple and cheap offsetting means (conserving a piece of forest at risk of being 
logged could compensate for the CO2 of a coal plant at a lower cost than reducing the 
emission source), and pilots were implemented in Central America (Moura-Costa & 
Stuart, 1998). At the negotiation session in 1997, developed nations agreed to comply 
with emission limits in a new treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, which envisioned several 
trading schemes to facilitate their task (Grubb et al., 1999). In particular, the Clean 
Development Mechanism was established to allow emission reductions from clean 
activities carried out in developing nations to partially compensate for CO2 liberated 
by industrial processes in developed nations. The Conference of the Parties thus 
endorsed the practice of offsetting, but tropical forests were given a marginal role. 
Several delegations, Brazil notably, had relentlessly argued that the use of forests for 
development purpose is a sovereign matter, that trees’ capacity to absorb carbon is not 
permanent because they die, and that conservation activities displace rather than avoid 
deforestation (Fry, 2002). Eventually, only plantations were authorized in the 
emerging offset market. This dispute shaped REDD+; in the proposal mentioned 
above that seemed to promise the end of tropical forest loss, the national territory 
instead of small-scale areas was to be the unit for measuring results and distributing 
rewards, serving to reassert national demarcations in a global politics. 
RED (for ‘reducing emissions from deforestation’) was put on the negotiation 
agenda in 2007, later replaced by REDD (a second ‘D’ for ‘and forest degradation’) 
and REDD+ (‘+’ for ‘and conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks’). Gradually the topic was endowed with various 
aims and requirements. The Conference of the Parties invited nations willing to 
benefit from monetary rewards to compute baselines of deforestation and emission 
levels and equip themselves with monitoring and reporting systems in order to assess 
changes in forest cover and carbon stocks. It also emphasized that in domestic actions 
to reduce forest loss, local communities should be consulted with, indigenous rights 
respected, and biological diversity protected. As negotiators speaking on behalf of 
poor nations requested that resources were quickly made available, it became clear 
that a preparatory phase financed by wealthy donor governments was necessary 
before the carbon stored in tropical forests could be routinely accounted for. REDD+ 
progressively turned into a multivalent matter, enmeshed with overseas aid, the 
defense of human rights, and the protection of nature.xi 
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Over time, one aspect of REDD+ persisted: securing the future of tropical 
forests would entail financial flows from developed to developing nations, only the 
modalities of these incentivizing transfers were debated. xii  The offsetting option 
initially suggested did not disappear, neither was it positively endorsed. In Cancun in 
2010, the point was surrounded by vagueness because delegations were polarized. 
Some supported international carbon trading, like the Coalition for Rainforest Nations 
formed around the 2005 proposal and counting a fluctuating membership of 20 to 50 
nation-states five years later. xiii  Others fiercely opposed it, like Brazil and the 
Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our America, arguing that offsets would divert 
developed economies from bearing their historical responsibility for global warming. 
The Cancun Agreements eventually tasked negotiators ‘to explore financing options’ 
(UNFCCC, 2014, p. 9). Bolivian negotiators publicly opposed the text at the closing 
plenary because they disagreed with the latent possibility of the promised incentives 
being linked to market transactions, while their former allies seemed content with the 
noncommittal wording. 
The development of REDD+ presented so far already suggests that science 
remains very much in the background at UN meetings. IPCC’s numbers did help to 
establish the carbon emitted by tropical deforestation as a new concern, but the latter 
really intensified once brought into the negotiation process. And when the American 
lawyer-negotiator for Papua New Guinea would speak on behalf of the Coalition for 
Rainforest Nations, his word weighed heavily in part because he potentially stood for 
more than four hundred million hectares of forests - principally in DRC and Indonesia 
and as quantified by remote sensing techniques - but also because he had mastered 
United Nations decision-making style. In climate international gatherings, debates are 
not about scientific evidence. Rather, their focus is on future financial transfers and 
how tropical forests ought to be enrolled in such promissory transactions. 
Meetings of the Conference of the Parties have actually engendered a specific 
field of know-how: the negotiation itself. Negotiators must master the history of a 
negotiated item, the format of UNFCCC decisions (numbered paragraphs introduced 
with action verbs like urge, request, invite, etc.) and the art of what they call 
‘constructive ambiguity’. xiv  Ambiguous wording is crafted during the ‘informals’ 
taking place between the opening and closing plenaries. Informals bring together an 
ad hoc group of delegates specialized in an item, for example REDD+, and concerned 
by its topic, tropical forests as carbon sinks. Debates, now only in English, are 
orchestrated at the discretion of a chairwoman, who momentarily abandons her 
national affiliation to work with UN staff on building consensus. For the Filipino 
delegate who skillfully chaired the informals on REDD-plus financing in 2011, the ad 
hoc assembly of the 50 or so political professionals formed a ‘big family’. Informals 
provide a physical and temporal space wherein acquainted delegates unknown to the 
general public acquire some freedom from the countries they represent to engage in 
alliances and compromises beyond national differences. The dismissal of Bolivia’s 
objection in 2010 had actually seemed justified by the aggressiveness and isolation of 
its representatives. 
Besides its theatricality, United Nations politics is also quite opaque. 
Informals are not a priori accessible to the media and accredited non-state observers, 
with security guards carefully enforcing the rule based on the colour of participants’ 
badges. The Conference of the Parties openly operates in secrecy; or rather semi-
secrecy, as members of advocacy organizations can infiltrate national delegations. For 
example, an activist in charge of Greenpeace’s forest campaign in the Congo Basin 
attended the Durban meeting in 2011 as a Belgian representative. The undercover 
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environmentalist speaking on behalf of the world’s forests did not directly negotiate. 
She only updated Greenpeace members and other observers stayed outside the 
negotiation room who could pester and pressure delegates. The reference in REDD+ 
to biological diversity and indigenous rights is attributed to this active interference. In 
Durban, based on its insider’s information, Greenpeace thus convened a press 
conference to denounce the behaviour of Colombian delegates in the informals on 
REDD+ financing. A satirical cartoon was distributed showing them as greedy ducks 
defending carbon trading for personal enrichment purposes. But this time, negotiators 
unanimously condemned the act. The shaming tactic, classic in activist politics xv, 
could further polarize the debate and jeopardize the possibility of an agreement. The 
governmental-nongovernmental boundary could be partially blurred as long as a form 
of confidentiality was ensured. 
Before it is publicly voiced, the word of the United Nations is disputed term 
by term. Proposals are put forward, paragraphs and words introduced, deleted, or 
placed in brackets if contentious (cf. Riles, 2001). Distinct options take shape, 
ephemeral coalitions form behind them, and a few individuals end up writing for the 
whole world. In 2011, French representatives had a mandate: given the public debt 
crisis, REDD+ funding should be private and authorize offsets. But because the 
European Union negotiates as one body, this view had to be nuanced. Other European 
delegates, more critical of carbon offsetting, wanted to support the ‘non-market 
mechanism’ just proposed by Bolivia, which eventually joined the possibility of 
markets in what became the ‘European option’. During the whole meeting, Bolivian 
negotiators received special attention because, in the negotiations’ spirit of 
inclusiveness, nobody wanted a repeat of the public protest that happened the year 
before in Cancun. At some point, the informals became a bilateral negotiation 
between the spokesperson of the Coalition for Rainforest Nations supporting the 
European option and the Brazilian delegation whose alternative option, backed by 
Bolivia, defended the non-market mechanism and rejected offsets. The night before 
the end of the session, a consensual one-page text was finally obtained and celebrated 
with hugs, tears and beers by the dozen negotiators most actively engaged in building 
consensus. Endorsed at the final plenary, the document agreed that both market and 
non-market approaches could be developed (UNFCCC, 2014, p. 15). If the decision 
seems not to say much, delegates accustomed to deciphering UN wording read the 
‘language on markets’ as ‘weak’ because no actionable mechanism was in sight, 
although offsetting had not been excluded either, and REDD+ still remained a 
promise. 
International consensus, as this section has shown, is a matter of iteration 
which relies on both theatricality, to stage an international assembly, and discretion, 
to craft agreements across national demarcations. The results of these moments of 
geopolitical re-composition are minimal and ambiguous decisions. No coercive action 
has been taken with REDD+, such as a global ban on specific deforestation practices. 
Rather, we encounter a transactional and promissory politics, framed in terms of 
incentive, support, and actions to occur in an indeterminate future. Meetings of the 
Conference of the Parties aimed, it seems, to create a collective that disagrees on 
many things but shares a concern, here for tropical forests and their carbon, and a 
commitment to the possibility of deliberation. As it enacts such a requirement for 
being global, the formulation of international consensus leads to vague, multivalent 





The work of preparatory agents 
 
A different site of geopolitical re-composition comes into focus here: Kinshasa, the 
capital city of a nation, DRC, whose territory contains vast areas of rainforest (the 
second largest after Brazil), about which, however, little scientific knowledge has 
been produced. Since 2007, when CO2 emissions from deforestation officially became 
a problem, the Conference of the Parties repeatedly requested developed nations to 
orient overseas aid towards REDD+. International transfers of financial and technical 
resources should now consider tropical forests as carbon sinks. REDD+ and its 
promissory politics thus have also been taking shape beyond conference centres, in 
particular through so-called readiness processes. 
In 2011, REDD-plus was a major topic of conversation in Congolese 
ministerial circles. The interest was sustained by the work of a few expatriates 
belonging to ‘the REDD National Coordination’. Set up in 2009, this technical 
secretariat was composed of a dozen members, referred to as national (Congolese) 
and international (foreign) consultants. The physical existence of offices, computers 
and Wi-Fi in a rented building, staff hired on an annual basis with salaries by far 
exceeding the meagre unreliable wages of the public sector, all depended on fixed-
term foreign funding in the form of readiness grants. The grants were provided by two 
multilateral programmes, one managed by the World Bank and the other by UN 
agencies.xvi Though their governance was independent from the UNFCCC process, 
the funding schemes proposed to help nations preparing themselves for REDD+ as its 
requirements would be decided by the Conference of the Parties. With 145 million 
hectares of forests affected in the early 2000s by a roughly estimated deforestation 
rate of 0.25 per cent (MECNT, 2010, p. 11), DRC, one of the poorest countries in the 
world, deserved readiness support. Relying on these external resources, the 
Coordination nevertheless acted on behalf of the nation, under the oversight of the 
ministry of environment, in the person of its director for sustainable development. 
This individual was also one of the main negotiators for DRC, who in 2005 made the 
country part of the emerging Coalition of Rainforest Nations which contributed to the 
birth of REDD+. 
Overseas aid is everywhere in DRC (Trefon, 2011). In the administrative 
centre of Kinshasa, this international presence materializes in the blue and white 
compounds of the UN peacekeeping mission, jeeps from the many agencies 
intervening in the country, and white people living in gated residencies owned by 
Lebanese families with Chinese businessmen as neighbours. This was the 
cosmopolitan living environment of the few young expatriates of the Coordination, 
whose personal trajectories had also crossed national borders. One previously worked 
on a banking reform in Madagascar; another discovered REDD+ during a research 
internship in environmental policy in Panama; a third one used to be a World Wide 
Fund staff member in Uganda and later in DRC’s Kivu region. After three or four 
years in Kinshasa, they all moved on, replaced by new consultants. In the meantime, 
they worked as preparatory agents for REDD+. Whereas they had no scientific 
expertise in ecology or satellite imagery, they had become acquainted with Congolese 
ministerial life and were skilled in mobilizing around the emerging issue.xvii 
International overseas aid consultants usually have an acute sense of their 
temporary passage. This is particularly true here given the elusive purpose of the 
readiness process: to make the country ready for something (REDD+) that was itself 
not ready.xviii The Coordination mainly sought to ‘graft’ a concern for the importance 
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of tropical forests and their carbon onto other interventions which would outlast its 
preparatory work. A successful graft was the inclusion of climate change mitigation 
as a pillar of DRC’s 2011-2015 poverty alleviation strategy. The consultants were 
also trying to encourage a large-scale agricultural development project that included 
the rehabilitation of a road network to account for its impact on forest cover. But 
securing strong commitments to such a vague thing as REDD+ in a fragile state like 
DRC was not easy. With aid support, the civil servants in the forestry administration 
were busy enforcing a moratorium on new logging rights and digitizing concession 
coordinates;xix in this respect, REDD+ seemed of little help. The Congolese Institute 
for Nature Conservation was not involved in the readiness process either, too 
concerned with counting its workforce and addressing security issues in national 
parks. And despite the desire of the environment minister to use REDD+ to 
financially support sustainable forest management, even the union of timber 
companies quickly lost interest in a hypothetical policy unable to solve mundane 
problems like the lack of equipment to unload logs in Kinshasa’s port. We see here 
examples of territorial processes (agriculture, roads, logging, etc.) that would need to 
be deeply transformed to secure forests as carbon sinks. But at the time, REDD+ was 
mainly a political will with little operational capacity. 
As preparatory agents, the consultants were promoting the idea of forests 
being carbon sinks in all sorts of meetings, from informal conversations to gatherings 
of a hundred people, most of them in the capital city.xx A recurring message was: 
REDD+ means substantial revenues. The message travelled well and created 
expectations along the way, making a provincial politician from Mbandaka, a city on 
the Congo River 600 kilometres from Kinshasa, wonder ‘where is the REDD money?’ 
Discussion about money was continual within the Coordination, whether it was the 
US$10 per diem distributed to participants in a meeting or hundreds of million dollars 
expected from a future programme. xxi  Here I want to emphasize the mobilizing 
purpose of this focus on money that epitomizes the promissory dimension of REDD+. 
Conjuring up revenues aimed to create a shared interest beyond immediate struggles 
and distinct, possibly contradictory, concerns. It pointed to a vague vision of a future 
of plenty whose temporality remained indeterminate. The consultants talked of 
‘pitching’ and ‘announcement effects’ to describe this part of their work, the 
transformative power of which on DRC’s economic situation was very, very limited. 
At times they seemed to briefly let themselves believe in the possibility of great 
improvement through REDD+, while experienced civil servants reminded them of 
past attempts to establish international forest policy that ended up being pure 
gesture.xxii 
For bits of this promised money to arrive in DRC, the Coordination was 
involved in fund raising. Consultants wrote applications to other funding schemes in 
the hope to deploy REDD+ outside Kinshasa (Gray, 2017). They also wanted to 
engage directly with donor representatives, especially from Norway, famous in the 
REDD+ milieu for its result-based bilateral agreements with Brazil and Indonesia. 
The English-speaking white men sought to represent DRC at its best in what they 
considered as an international competition for funding. In 2010, wondering whether it 
might consider a special relationship with DRC and its forests, the Norwegian aid 
agency ordered an assessment of corruption risks by PricewaterhouseCoopers. In 
response, the Coordination tried to demonstrate its willingness to address the concern. 
The main evidence put forward to argue that DRC could be an honourable partner 
was a new legal text and its online registry. The device sought to regulate how 
forested land could be accessed by CO2 offsetting projects to avoid having ‘carbon 
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cowboys’ bribing local politicians with no intention to subject their activity to 
metrological requirements. xxiii  In light of the PricewaterhouseCoopers verdict that 
corruption is a pervasive feature of Congolese society, the Norwegians would have 
needed stronger reassurance. The legal intervention reveals how unrealistic the 
readiness process could be. It also shows how, in trying to attract both public aid 
(non-market approach) and private offsetting (market approach), the Coordination 
made use of the constructive ambiguity cultivated within UN negotiations. 
In DRC, REDD+ navigated ministerial hopes for the future of logging, 
donors’ preoccupation with governance, and demands expressed by civil society 
organizations. Participatory obligations are a well-established feature of overseas aid 
and a REDD+ requirement. The Coordination regularly held ‘workshops’ to keep 
informed Kinshasa-based activists speaking on behalf of local communities, 
especially in regard to future funding.xxiv For these professionalized spokespersons, 
REDD+ had become a new lever to defend old causes. The adoption of community-
based forest concessions envisioned in the Congolese forest code was one of them. By 
reframing the battle for customary property as a possible REDD+ action, civil society 
representatives wanted the readiness process to pressure the minister to endorse the 
legal text they had drafted. The activists, who knew how to lobby with well-oiled 
narratives of local communities being respectful forest dwellers, were eventually 
successful. In particular, they were able to activate their connection to environmental 
and indigenous rights organizations based in Europe, like Greenpeace’s Parisian 
office, whose capacity to generate bad publicity was feared by the Coordination as it 
was by negotiators.xxv 
A last facet of the work of preparatory agents I want to evoke here takes us 
back precisely to the Conference of the Parties. The consultants were members of the 
Congolese delegation, but had no interest in wording disputes. In their view, 
UNFCCC decisions had little authority over actual REDD+ funding arrangements. At 
the 2011 session, instead of attending the informals, they were organizing side events 
for the ministry of environment to display its achievements. Side events are mini 
conferences convened by delegations or non-state observers in parallel to negotiations 
(Schroeder & Lovell, 2012). Their audience varies, depending on current interests. In 
Durban, more than 60 people (delegates, environmental and human rights activists, 
scientists, and aid experts) came over to hear about REDD+ in DRC. The high 
attendance can be attributed to the consultants’ mobilizing work. Yet, during the 
event, they remained backstage and only Congolese citizens spoke, including from 
civil society organizations critical of the Coordination. The preparatory agents were 
not meant to be public figures. When in Kinshasa the readiness process constantly 
blurred the Congolese-foreign divide, for a performance taking part in UN 
theatricality, a national identity was demarcated and staged. 
The geopolitics through which tropical forests become stocks of carbon, as 
this section has shown, is also located in the ministerial offices of a country like DRC, 
with consultants trying to enrol support for a negotiated policy yet-to-come. These 
cosmopolitan figures knew how to navigate the worlds of overseas aid and Congolese 
politics. To re-compose international relations around the carbon stored in DRC’s 
forests, they worked as preparatory agents and spent most of their time holding 
meetings, applying for financial resources, and claiming that REDD+ could bring 
about bright futures. Such promises helped turn a vague global exigency into local 
conversations about development, forest policy and law; REDD+ seemed to promise 
the eradication of poverty, corruption and the oppression of forest dwellers. But the 
preparatory intervention had little purchase on the vast national territory and its 
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forests. As we shall see now, acting to durably transform landscapes requires more 
than talks, and notably the deployment of metrological practices. 
 
 
The quest for metrological inclusiveness 
 
In Kinshasa, the forest was too abstract an entity, while the financial struggles of both 
urban dwellers and the state could be encountered on a daily basis: hence the focus on 
money in the readiness process. Yet, it would be a mistake to conclude that REDD+ 
geopolitics is reducible to vague wording and economized promises. Through a back-
and-forth movement between textual battles in conference centres and the 
implementation of CO2 emission reduction efforts, the promissory could translate into 
(limited) concrete actions. Even in DRC, activities were being developed that 
involved tangible trees and measurement and calculation tools. By tracing these 
interventions, we can observe how international consensus and the work of 
preparatory agents combine with a quest for metrological inclusiveness. 
The expatriate consultants working for the Congolese ministry of environment 
were trying to obtain financial resources to launch actions in forested areas. In 
particular, they choose to make plantations and the sustainable production of charcoal 
the focus of an application to a REDD+-related fund (Climate Investment Fund, 2016; 
Gray, 2017). Their idea was to encourage the replication of a flagship project. 
Initiated in the mid-2000s about 150 kilometres northeast from Kinshasa, the 
afforestation project was an offsetting activity that was part of the Clean Development 
Mechanism. A Belgian-Congolese entrepreneur, whose family had customary rights 
over the area, was managing what was the first intervention in DRC explicitly related 
to UNFCCC climate action, a plantation of acacia trees. The chosen Australian 
variety had been used in the region since the 1980s in a nearby plantation financed by 
overseas aid and supplying Kinshasa with sustainable charcoal. The new afforestation 
activity ought to similarly commercialize the energy source in addition to carbon 
offsets. To start planting trees, a loan from Belgian investors had been secured based 
on the signature of two forward sales of the expected offsets whose actual exchange 
was meant to happen later, in 2017. One buyer was a French bank that resold the 
forthcoming emission reductions to a multinational agribusiness compensating for its 
CO2 to meet environmental responsibility requirements. Another buyer was a fund 
managed by the World Bank in Washington DC, where the organization had 
developed internal expertise to support projects and purchase offsets for governments 
committed to limit their emissions through the Kyoto Protocol. This set-up, which 
locates climate action in an entrepreneurial project connecting distant, mostly private, 
entities across national borders, epitomizes what negotiators call a market approach. 
To become an economically productive carbon sink, trees must be enriched 
with metrological evidence.xxvi The registration of a project and the issuance of offsets 
by UNFCCC secretariat in Bonn rely on paperwork complying with carbon 
accounting rules decided by the Conference of the Parties and audited by a third party. 
An afforestation activity includes regular inventory: sampling plots, measuring the 
circumference of trunks, applying equations to convert this measure into biomass, and 
multipliers to translate biomass into carbon stock. xxvii  What counts then is not 
scientific rigour. The multiplier and the equation used to compute the carbon stored 
by the acacias in the Congolese savannah were quite generic: the former was a default 
value found in IPCC good practices and guidance which provide calculative tools to 
foster participation in emission reduction efforts; the latter came from a scientific 
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article published in the 1990s by the French overseas cooperation agency about the 
same acacias variety planted and studied in the Republic of Congo. Inclusiveness 
guides UN politics, allowing for such approximate estimates. Here measurements and 
calculations do not generate facts but establish rough equivalences so that offsets can 
circulate from DRC to a distant source of emissions. 
The Clean Development Mechanism was not as multivalent a UN policy as 
REDD+; it was very much oriented towards the calculation and promise of tradable 
quantities of carbon. Emission reductions would be computed by comparing the CO2 
stored by the registered project with a baseline (what would happened if the activity is 
not carried out, see Ehrenstein & Muniesa, 2013), and they could be anticipated in 
forward contracts by using generic values of trees’ growth rates from the IPCC. But 
when in 2011 the owner of the Congolese plantation began to inventory the carbon 
accumulated so far, initial results indicated that the neat rows of acacias hardly 
distinguishable amid the tall grass of the savannah were storing less than expected by 
the projections based on which the future sale had been agreed. Various reasons were 
invoked (bushfires, high mortality rates, delays, etc.); in a nutshell, the behaviour of 
the plantation did not match expectations. The transaction became uncertain along 
with the possibility of repaying the invested capital, placing the entrepreneur in a 
difficult situation. While his project had not triggered local disputes over land use, it 
encountered living things unsettling the promissory predictions. 
Regardless of the difficulty to ensure the offsetting capacity of planted trees, 
the consultants driving DRC’s readiness process decided to put afforestation centre 
stage when applying for additional REDD+ funds. Plantations, they thought, might 
decrease the reliance on fuel wood collected in standing forests. The assumption was 
slightly speculative. Tasked by the Coordination to study the causes of deforestation, 
researchers based in Belgium could not assert whether the practice was responsible 
for much forest loss. Their investigational method combined historic satellite images 
with geo-localized information and the collection of fuel wood had no easily traceable 
proxy besides demographic data and visual patterns of forest fragmentation visible on 
high-resolution images (MECNT, 2012). To the consultants, the fuel wood economy 
nevertheless formed a tangible domain of intervention; there was practical know-how 
(existing plantations); charcoal bags could be seen everywhere along the roads 
leading to Kinshasa; agronomists from a French research centre had measured that the 
value of the charcoal market in the capital city exceeded national timber exports 
(Schure et al., 2011); and compared to slash-and-burn agriculture, another 
deforestation driver, it was a topic much less engaged by civil society organizations 
defending forest dwellers. 
Several points can be noted here that might relate to the porosity and resilience 
of national demarcation in REDD+. First, from French agronomists to Belgian remote 
sensing experts, the readiness process depended entirely on foreign technical 
expertise. Both the metrological instruments and the skills needed to study Congolese 
forests were located abroad. The implication of this scientific outsourcing was, 
however, less clear than a loss of sovereignty given that, secondly, the evidential 
material was used in an instrumental manner. xxviii  Interventions in the name of 
REDD+ tended to move away from a focus on CO2 and to develop on fragile 
evidential grounds, which left room for manoeuvre. There was no plan to 
retrospectively verify the claim that plantations help decreasing forest loss. Finally, 
the deforestation cause targeted by the programme was domestic. DRC’s forests may 
not be as affected by global trade as Indonesia’s and Brazil’s. But making 
deforestation a national matter related to household habits can also be attributed to a 
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failed attempt to discuss globalized drivers (e.g. palm oil consumption or timber 
exports) within UN negotiations.xxix 
 Before a secured grant translates into growing trees and new supply chains, 
many details must be clarified first. It is only at the time of writing this paper that the 
programme evoked above enters into operation. What we see at the planning stage is 
the involvement of metrological montages able to depict the large-scale phenomena to 
be transformed. The consultants could delimit the programme areas, three zones of 
deforestation frontier around major urban centres, thanks to a visualization of the 
Congolese territory superposing forest cover in 2010 and deforestation events 
between 2000, 2005 and 2010.xxx Published by a mapping initiative from American 
universities, the visual tool was another external resource enrolled by the preparatory 
agents. Interestingly, the map reveals intensive forest loss in the eastern part of the 
territory known for its wildlife, but also for a state of continual violence because of 
which the consultants did not select the ‘hot spot’ evidenced by satellite images. More 
pacified zones were privileged in order to reassure donors.xxxi 
In the case of REDD+, at least in terms of how it was treated within UN 
negotiations, it was expected that vast surfaces covered with tropical forests would be 
closely monitored. In Brazil for example, the forestry administration has been 
equipped for quite some time with a sophisticated remote sensing system, combining 
data from different satellites and linked to law enforcement procedures. There is 
nothing comparable in DRC, too disconnected from Earth observation infrastructures. 
An agreement between governments from the Congo Basin and the European space 
agency was passed in 2011 that gave the former free access to satellite images. But 
telecommunication networks in Kinshasa’s administrative buildings could simply not 
handle such heavy data. Negotiators acknowledged these unequal metrological 
capacities (Rominj et al., 2012). It was a source of worry because in the logic of 
REDD+, places deprived of calculative devices are seen as having no interest in 
caring for the carbon of their forests. In response, the remote sensing community has 
mobilized to develop more user-friendly measurement methods (Lovell, 2013). DRC 
even became a sort of textbook case for imagining inclusive rules, and, at a side event 
in Durban, one could hear European scientists discuss how best to use NASA’s free-
of-charge coarse images of Congolese forests to compute deforestation rates and 
carbon losses. 
REDD+ actually expanded the metrological inclusiveness characteristic of UN 
climate policies and already identifiable in the Clean Development Mechanism. For 
example, negotiators agreed that baselines should build on ‘historic data’, but at the 
request of African nations, a decision added the possibility to ‘adjust for national 
circumstances’ (UNFCCC, 2014, p. 7). The Congo Basin being less damaged than the 
Amazon, the argumentation went, development prospects would legitimately increase 
deforestation and make historic records unfair baselines. In DRC, the case for 
adjustment was made in a glossy report written by the consulting firm McKinsey at 
high cost as part of the readiness process. Assessing the CO2 reduction potential of 
various interventions, the analysis projected a very optimistic baseline for industrial 
logging so that a reduction could be claimed even with a deforestation rate higher 
than in the past (MECNT, 2009). In online publications and with flyers distributed at 
UNFCCC meetings, Greenpeace fiercely criticized the modelling exercise for its poor 
data and the vested interests behind the assumptions (Greenpeace, 2011). Undesirable 
from an environmental perspective, a sudden growth of the moribund timber industry 
was also unrealistic. The report amounted to a motivational exercise expressing the 
developmentalist hopes of the environment minister and some of his advisers 
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(including from bilateral donor agencies). With baseline adjustment, a right to 
develop was incorporated in the multivalent policy at the risk of undermining its 
initial aim to decrease deforestation. 
Over time, the evidential demands of REDD+ have remained fairly lax. In 
2013, after eight years of discussion, the Conference of the Parties finalized a 
‘framework’ providing guidelines and an independent assessment process to national 
governments willing to report deforestation and emission reduction efforts; no 
obligation was attached and ambiguity persisted. Negotiators, for example, authorized 
‘subnational monitoring and reporting as an interim measure’ without clarifying what 
‘interim’ meant (UNFCCC, 2014, p. 9). Since then, voluntary offsetting standards 
have been certifying small-scale biodiversity conservation activities named ‘REDD 
projects’ (including in DRC). Discussions have been taking place in California on the 
possibility of linking its cap-and-trade system to medium-scale REDD+ actions in 
Brazil and Mexico. And the World Bank is pursuing sub-national interventions with a 
new result-based scheme following up on its readiness funding (including in DRC). It 
is often unclear to what extent such loudly announced initiatives are implemented to 
transform forested landscapes.xxxii What is clear though, is that REDD+ keeps being 
diffracted into manifold, multivalent actions. 
As we examine activities more directly affecting the existence of tangible trees 
and vast forested areas, we encounter metrological practices instrumental in 
translating REDD+ geopolitics into concrete emission reduction efforts. This section 
showed that, with a lack of scientific infrastructure and a use of evidential material to 
convey political aspirations, DRC is a good location to witness the quest for 
inclusiveness that characterizes international climate policies. It also showed that 
REDD+ has not become an operational UN mechanism with strict carbon accounting 
rules. Rather, what its multivalent and promissory nature has led to is a variety of 
engagements with trees, of limited spatial deployment and whose realization must be 
interrogated. It seems that the negotiators we met in the first section of this paper 
spent a great deal of energy on wording the balance between ‘market’ and ‘non-
market’ approaches only to accommodate divergences and ensure that a vague but 





A complex evidential infrastructure has made global warming a matter of concern. 
This has now been well documented. But restricting our attention to climate models 
and the IPCC does not tell us much about the responses being devised and how global 
warming can become a matter of global concern in an unequal world. To explore this 
point, the paper followed the negotiation of ‘policy approaches and positive 
incentives on issues relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and 
enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’ (REDD+) inside 
conference centers and beyond, notably in the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 
 When compared with Europe and the United States, Central Africa is clearly 
not a place that is responsible for global warming. My interest in the forests of the 
Congo Basin does not imply that I think acting on the globalized oil economy (see 
Mitchell, 2011) should not be the priority to address carbon emissions, which is 
sometimes a motive to justify carbon offsetting. But regardless of historical 
responsibilities, the future of the global climate depends on tropical forests, including 
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those in DRC - probably more than we think. Scientists recently have pointed to the 
existence of a vast peat land along the Congo River (Dargie et al., 2017). The 
decomposed organic matter could store as much carbon as the trees standing above it, 
the equivalent potentially of 20 times current annual fossil fuels emissions from the 
United States. As the new fact makes the Congo Basin a very consequential 
component of climatic evolution, this paper sought to give a glimpse of the political 
challenges posed by maintaining the existence of this carbon sink. 
To do so, I examined three interrelated processes: the formulation of 
international consensus, the work of preparatory agents, and the quest for 
metrological inclusiveness. We saw that the ambiguous wording of decisions 
endorsed by the United Nations aimed to accommodate divergences and maintain a 
forum for debate. We followed preparatory agents trying to mobilize around the 
vague policy, whose work suggested the extent of the difficulties entailed in the 
transformation of forested landscapes. And finally, we looked at inclusive 
measurement and calculation tools (IPCC default values, deforestation maps, etc.) 
through which the promissory commitment to reduce emissions from tropical 
deforestation might translate into modest concrete interventions and bring tangible 
trees into politics (cf. Latour, 2004). Metrological inclusiveness means producing 
global evidence (of forest cover across the world) and globalizing access to the 
capacity to produce evidence. Compared to how ecologists understand the biosphere, 
the new political existence of tropical forests as carbon sinks is, then, a rude 
simplification. In place of demonstrating a scientific fact, the quest for metrological 
inclusiveness, together with the formulation of international consensus and the work 
of preparatory agents, contributes to the assertion of a global exigency: by means of 
the activity described in this paper, the carbon of tropical forests demands worldwide 
and comprehensive attention, discussion, and action.xxxiii 
 The tergiversations around REDD+ provided an example of global politics in 
action, or rather a new form of geopolitics: a timid multivalent concern for earthly 
things. This concern has emerged through relations developing between nations, by 
means of an attracting force distinct from national sovereignty - as in the semi-secrecy 
of informals crafting compromises, the movements of expatriates acting on behalf of 
Congolese authorities and metrological montages stretching across national borders. 
These processes were able to bring a new issue into being and shape it in such a way 
as to enrol as many supporters as possible, even if it meant nurturing ambiguity, 
making assertions on unstable evidential grounds, and voicing promises that might 
not materialize. In this respect, REDD+ bears strong resemblance to the move within 
biodiversity conservation towards ‘enterprising nature’ (Dempsey, 2016), a 
‘socioecological-economic utopia whose realization is always just around the corner’ 
(Dempsey, 2016, p. 3), which is also sustained by diplomatic meetings, calculative 
practices and cosmopolitan actors. In such environmental, economized, elusive-yet-
enduring interventions, we witness a kind of optimistic unrealism that leaks out of the 
air-conditioned atmosphere of conference centers but barely intervenes in the 
complicated processes causing deforestation, CO2 emissions or biodiversity loss. To 
conclude, then, I would like to suggest that it might now be time for the carbon sink 
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i The paper builds on multi-sited fieldwork done principally from 2010 to 2012, during which a 
heterogeneous corpus concerning REDD+ was constituted (UNFCCC decisions, grey literature, 
reports, press releases, blogs, etc.), many interviews and informal conversations were conducted, and 
ethnographic observations carried out (within the ministry of environment of the Democratic Republic 
of Congo in Kinshasa in spring 2011, during a field trip to a plantation in the Congolese savannah in 
April 2011, in a business fair dedicated to carbon markets in Barcelona in June 2011, and at the session 
of the Conference of the Parties in Durban in December 2011). 
ii The contribution of tropical forests to the global carbon cycle is a debated issue among scientists, in 
particular whether these forests are a net absorber of carbon dioxide (see Lahsen, 2009). My use of the 
expression ‘carbon sink’ in the paper is then quite bold and aims to emphasise that forests store carbon. 
iii The potentially problematic link between evidential practices and politics in environmental policy is 
explored by Mathews (2013), who proposes to consider official statements of success about a national 
reforestation initiative in Mexico (high numbers of planted trees) as risky ‘knowledge performances’ 
that can be unmade by audits and trigger public outrage. 
iv Lovell (2013) shows that REDD+ has also engendered scientific activities around the measurement 
of forest cover and carbon stocks and suggests that these have supported ‘an optimistic “measure and 
manage” discourse’ within UN negotiation (Lovell, 2013, p. 181). To my knowledge and as this paper 
will argue, this discourse has remained an unfulfilled ideal. 
v In his reflection on the IPCC, Wynne (2010) suggests that a form of optimism might also be found in 
early climate models and the simulation of change as a continuous, gradual process. 
vi Rethinking political life in light of scientific practices and living things is one of Latour’s long-
standing enterprise (Latour, 2004). His recent work engages with global warming and argues for re-
arranging political representation: instead of an obsolete international division, ill-suited to capture the 
entangled processes and interests that have caused global warming and therefore ought to be 
transformed, the collectives in negotiation should be envisioned as territorial, humans-nonhumans 
polities (Latour, 2015). 
vii The case resonates with Riles (2001) who describes a Fijian non-governmental network involved in 
UN World Conferences on Women and shows the tension between procedural form and political 
substance. 
viii The Cancun Agreements re-established the legitimacy of the political forum after Copenhagen, 
when no consensus was achieved because a coalition (Tuvalu, Sudan and several South American 
nations including Bolivia) opposed the idea of CO2 reduction efforts being distributed among 
developed and developing nations (Bodansky, 2010). 
ix The UNFCCC website provides access to all decisions and submissions: http://unfccc.int/2860.php. 
x In 2003, Environmental Defense and the Amazon Environmental Research Institute suggested to 
allow developing nations to issue tradable emission reductions from a decrease in deforestation 
(Schlamadinger et al., 2005, p. 54). 
xi Despite the multivalence of REDD+ and its difficulties in translating into concrete actions, as we will 
see thorough the paper, the 2007 IPCC assessment and the high-profile Stern review reasserted that 
tropical forests were a cost-effective fix for the CO2 problem (La Viña & de Leon, 2014). 
xii Resulting from the routinized calculation of national incomes, the developed-developing division 
used in REDD+ is based on the economic situation of the world in the early 1990s. 
xiii Online, the Coalition for Rainforest Nations claims 52 member-nations, but at the 2011 UNFCCC 
session I was told that only about 20 delegations were aligned behind its spokesperson. The Coalition 
website can be found here: http://www.rainforestcoalition.org/nations.aspx. 
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xiv The constructive ambiguity of REDD+ decisions echoes what Barthe (2006) terms ‘zones of 
fuzziness’ in his analysis of the French legislation on nuclear waste; fuzzy wording does not reconcile 
divergences, but leaves open the possibility for contradictory views to evolve. According to Van der 
Sluijs et al. (1998), ambiguity understood as room for multiple and changing interpretation is also 
central in the ‘science for policy’ of the IPCC. 
xv The participation of nongovernmental organizations in international environmental and human rights 
policy is a well-researched topic (Keck & Sikkink, 1998). On scrutiny over governmental (and 
business) affairs and public performances see also Barry (2013a). 
xvi The programmes funding DRC’s readiness process are the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership 
Facility readiness fund and the UN-REDD programme of the United Nations Development 
Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and the Food and Agriculture Organization. 
xvii  In his seminal work on development, Ferguson (1994) states that aid projects ‘depoliticize’ 
problems (e.g., poverty) by turning them into technical matters (e.g., agricultural yield). His definition 
of politics remains implicit; it equates either to electoral politics or questions of economic 
dependencies. Here I consider that the consultants working as preparatory agents for REDD+ were 
engaged in an issue-oriented politics (cf. Marres, 2007). 
xviii The funding schemes deliberatively left open what a readiness process was supposed to achieve; 
they cultivated a kind of ‘intentional ambiguity’ in order to adapt to uncertain futures and diverse 
contexts like IMF’s and World Bank’s recent development policies (Best, 2011, p. 92). 
xix The Congolese forestry administration had been undergoing reforms since the mid-2000s (Debroux 
et al., 2007). 
xx The consultants’ mobilising work was happening in French, the official language of the Congolese 
administration. 
xxi The importance of monetary promises and rewards in DRC might relate to the fact that its economy 
is a form of rentiership based on mineral resources (copper, cobalt, etc.). 
xxii Weszkalnys (2015) uses the term ‘gesture’ to describe samples of matter, contracts, and institutional 
arrangements that ‘signal things to come’ while the resource (in her case, oil) remains hypothetical. 
xxiii The device mitigating corruption risks in REDD+ resembles a community-based procedure meant 
to allocate development funding in Indonesia examined by Li (2007). In both cases, corruption is 
expected to disappear through the interplay between legitimate payment and publicity. On institutional 
design for good governance see also Weszkalnys (2011). 
xxiv Ehrenstein and Laurent (2016) and Gray (2017) provide more details on the participation of civil 
society organizations in REDD+ in DRC. 
xxv Traveling along advocacy networks, complaints from Congolese organizations can end up online, as 
the Internet is an important resource for the environmental contestation of carbon markets (cf. Blok, 
2011). 
xxvi I borrow the idea of ‘informational enrichment’ from Barry’s analysis of a pipeline project and 
disputes about how its construction materials behave and ought to behave (2013a, p. 141). 
xxvii Lovell and MacKenzie (2015) describe how equations that estimate the carbon stock of trees are 
obtained. The purpose of such carbon accounting methods is to enable comparison across distant and 
different activities (cf. MacKenzie, 2009). 
xxviii On the internationalism of scientific research on tropical forests and the accusations of hegemony 
it can trigger see Lahsen (2009). 
xxix Deforestation drivers were put on the negotiation agenda but it led to noncommittal decision 
(UNFCCC, 2014, p. 41). 
xxx The mapping initiative ‘Monitoring the forests of Central Africa using remotely sensed data sets’ is 
accessible online: http://carpe.umd.edu/forest_monitoring/monitoring.php. 
xxxi The location of the afforestation activity in only a few selected areas across DRC echoes the 
‘transnational networks that connect economically valued spaces dispersed around the world in a point-
to-point fashion’ foregrounded by Ferguson (2006, p. 40). 
xxxii The offset scheme certifying ‘REDD projects’ that I refer to is called the Voluntary Carbon 
Standard and is described here: http://www.v-c-s.org/. 
The World Bank’s result-based funding is called the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility carbon fund 
and is described here: https://www.forestcarbonpartnership.org/carbon-fund-0. 
Finally, to access documents about the Californian cap-and-trade system and the possible inclusion of 
REDD+ offsets, see: 
https://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/capandtrade/sectorbasedoffsets/sectorbasedoffsets.htm. 
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xxxiii If the tergiversations around REDD+ have made the carbon absorbed by tropical forests a more 
visible issue, we are however quite a long way off to feel that as humans on Earth ‘we are of the plants’ 
as advocated by Myers (2016). 
